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I 
In a landmark article proposing a “politics of intellectual property”, James Boyle 
mentions two contrasting principles of intellectual property (IP). With IP being a 
public good, property rights can help bring IP into existence by reducing free riding on 
others’ efforts.2 Yet Boyle points to another legal tradition (1997, p. 97). Privatising 
knowledge restricts free speech. As Boyle points out:  
[C]ourts are traditionally much less sensitive to First Amendment, free 
speech and other “free flow of information arguments” when the context is 
viewed as private rather than public, or property rather than censorship. 
Thus, for example, the Supreme Court will refuse to allow the state to ban 
flag burning, but it is quite happy to create a property right in a general 
word such as “Olympic”, and allow the word to be appropriated by a private 
party which then selectively refuses public use of the word. Backed by this 
state-sponsored “homestead law for the English language,” the United States 
Olympic Committee (USOC) has decreed that the handicapped may have 
their “Special Olympics,” but that gay activists may not hold a “Gay 
Olympics.” The Court saw the USOC’s decision not as state censorship, but 
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as a mere exercise of its private property rights. (Emboldened, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist applied the same argument to the American flag.) 
Boyle proposes a new politics of IP. Admiring the way in which environmentalism 
imputed to environmental causes far greater ethical urgency than is conveyed in a cost 
benefit analysis, he seeks a similar politics of IP, one which engages us more deeply 
than mere accounting or economics. 
In this paper I suggest that paradoxically enough, economics can offer some help in 
this quest, or at least economics as its founder hoped it might become. Like Darwin, 
Adam Smith was a plodder and a perfectionist, pondering things for many years, 
seeking ways to minimise any offence they might cause, before setting out his views in 
print. Smith’s first major book was The Theory of Moral Sentiments published exactly 
250 years ago. It contained Smith‘s most fundamental thoughts about human beings 
and the society which they create, and which of course creates them. 
In this paper I argue that way back at the beginning of economics, Smith pioneered an 
approach to the creation of public goods which has gone largely ignored. This is very 
relevant to the philosophy of IP. Even more, Smith saw human development whether 
it was cultural or economic, as at bottom an expression of human sociality. And as 
Web 2.0 burgeons before us, Smith‘s thinking helps us see it in it’s most promising, it’s 
most glorious light: As a scaling up of human sociality itself. 
Against a backdrop in which certain Christian teachings had demonised self-interest, 
Smith sought to revive aspects of ancient traditions in which the pursuit of true 
enlightened self-interest is bound up with the quest for virtue. 
Along with other Enlightenment figures, Smith was in awe of the power and economy 
of Newton’s system of celestial mechanics involving as it did, “an immense chain of 
the most important and sublime truths . . . connected together by one capital fact, of 
the reality of which we have daily experience”.3 Emulating Newton, Smith‘s economics 
was built from a single principle – in this case human beings’ tendency to “truck barter 
and exchange”. And his meta theory of society in The Theory of Moral Sentiments was 
built upon the single principle of sympathy. Today the word “sympathy” typically 
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denotes some sentimental well-wishing towards another. Smith’s use of the word 
sometimes suggests this. But more fundamentally Smith argues that sympathy is our 
engine of social epistemology. As the second paragraph of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments explains: 
[Having] no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no 
idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the 
rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us 
of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own 
person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of 
what are his sensations. 
Imaginative sympathy gives us the tools to understand what others are thinking. Just 
as Shakespeare observed that all the world was a stage, Smith introduced a similar idea 
to social science (or moral philosophy, as he called it). Reflecting on our own 
observation of others, we realise that others observe us, and form opinions about us, 
just as we do about them. And from the cradle to the grave, we are hard wired to care 
deeply what others think of us.  
II 
Homo economicus – the pure, calculating egoist optimising his profit or ‘utility’ 
without regard for others’ views or conduct (except where they’re useful to his ends) is 
nowhere to be seen in Smith. With one possible exception. A newborn baby is a kind 
of inchoate homo economicus, a blob of infantile egoism – infans economicus if you 
like. But beyond this, the process that we now call socialisation progressively deepens 
and transforms us.  
As Smith makes clear, socialisation begins from infancy. Indeed, even if it were 
“possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place” 
there is no exposure to society without socialisation.  
he could no more think of his own character … than of the beauty or 
deformity of his own face … Bring him into society, and he is immediately 
provided with the mirror which he wanted before … all his own passions 
will immediately become the causes of new passions. He will observe that 
mankind approve of some of them, and are disgusted by others. He will be 
elevated in the one case, and cast down in the other. His desires and 
aversions, his joys and sorrows, will now often become the causes of new 
desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows: they will now, 
therefore, interest him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive 
consideration. 
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So much for homo economicus.  
Our craving of approval, our dread of disapproval, and our ability to understand 
others by imagining ourselves in their shoes, draws us into a lifelong dialectical social 
drama in which we’re all actors and spectators, not just of others’ actions, but 
ultimately of our own. We keep an eye on our own conduct contemplating what others 
might think of us. As we mature (and Smith knew that some mature more than 
others!) this internal questioning takes on its own moral force. We ultimately crave the 
love and approbation of those we most respect. And conscience emerges for Smith as a 
fictive impartial spectator which becomes the yardstick of our actions, and leads us 
towards virtue. For Smith, the whole of human society – its psychology, its sociology 
its economics, it’s social customs and mores and perhaps even its religion – is built on 
these simple foundations. 
Despite the enthusiasm with which it was met in Smith’s time, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments gradually slid into relative obscurity. Smith’s foundational moral 
philosophy of society generated no school of followers, let alone a discipline as The 
Wealth of Nations did. Yet, ironically, remarkably, as the division of intellectual labour 
is splintering the study of man more and more, modern neuroscience is confirming 
Smith‘s theory. Just as modern genetics provided the missing biological underpinnings 
for Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, so modern neurology is discovering that 
animals with brains like ours – monkeys and primates – are hard-wired for sympathy. 
In the 1990s, Italian neurophysiologists placed electrodes in monkeys’ brains to study 
how they co-ordinated their hands and mouths to eat. Having located the small region 
that fired when an animal lifted food to its mouth, they found that the same region 
fired – only less strongly – when one monkey simply watched another lift food to its 
mouth. An extensive network of so-called “mirror neurons” was discovered, which fire 
and enable monkeys to recreate within their own brains what’s going on in the brains 
of their fellows. Critically, mirror neurons don’t respond in a mechanical way to given 
physical movements but only when the observer interprets such movements as having 
been made with a given intention – for instance, eating. 
Just as Smith‘s Theory of Moral Sentiments had argued that we all share vicariously in 
the gamut of each others’ emotions, from elation, through to horror and disgust, so 
recent experiments show that brain regions which activate when we experience pain, 
disgust, happiness and other emotions, also activate when we observe others having 
similar experiences.  
III 
Before proceeding, we pause to note the intensely rhetorical nature of Smith’s theory. 
For we can misunderstand its emphases if we ignore its pervasive normative tone. 
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Smith’s first lectureship was in rhetoric, and his scientific contributions are subsumed 
within the contemporary eighteenth century rhetorical tradition encompassing the 
threefold task of delighting, instructing and persuading the reader to identify with 
virtue.4 The Theory of Moral Sentiments’ theory of virtue is itself delivered in a 
rhetorical package which engages in that quintessentially rhetorical practice of praising 
virtue and blaming vice.  
Almost invariably in the Moral Sentiments, whenever Smith praises virtue or points to 
our desire for approval, he mentions its shadow side – vice and our abhorrence of 
being thought unworthy by our fellows. Indeed a modern reader of Smith is likely to 
find him quite long winded and indeed – in the modern (pejorative) sense, rhetorical. 
Smith‘s books were like this because although they are also other things, Smith wrote 
them largely, perhaps principally, as invitations to his readers to virtue.  
It’s not appreciated how much even The Wealth of Nations, likewise conforms to this 
rhetorical tradition. To recap, let’s note the rhetorical resonances in what might be the 
most passionate passage in all of Smith’s writing. It is about the African slave trade.  
Every savage undergoes a sort of Spartan discipline, and by the necessity of 
his situation is inured to every sort of hardship … Fortune never exerted 
more cruelly her empire over mankind, than when she subjected those 
nations of heroes to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to wretches who 
possess the virtues neither of the countries which they come from, nor of 
those which they go to, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness, so justly 
expose them to the contempt of the vanquished. 
IV 
Although Smith can be rightly seen as an apostle of self-interest, one might also 
portray his contribution as delineating those public goods which are preconditions for 
self-interest to be socially constructive. Here, in a famous passage, Smith explains how 
the self-seeking individual in a market turns the exchange of private goods towards the 
common good.  
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor 
knows how much he is promoting it. . . . . [H]e intends only his own 
security; and by directing [his] industry [and capital] in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is 
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
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which was no part of his intention. He generally, indeed, neither intends to 
promote the publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it.  
So far Smith‘s has illustrated nothing more than the optimisation of the production 
and exchange of private goods, not the emergence of a public good. Though it was not 
clearly defined in Smith’s time, in modern economics public goods are characterised 
by non-rivalry and non-excludability. A wireless broadcast is non-rival because, unlike 
toasters or cars or fridges, if one house enjoys the broadcast it does nothing to prevent 
others from enjoying it. At least unencrypted, the broadcast is also non-excludable. 
Anyone can tune in. If someone must fund the broadcast, we may have a problem, 
because the potential for free riding undermines the ability to charge for the broadcast 
as we do for fridges and toasters.5 
But look a little closer and there are public goods that are both the precondition and 
consequence of the invisible hand of the market. The precedent, as Smith explains at 
length, and with great force, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, is a peaceful law-
abiding citizenry, and the rule of law, or what Smith called commutative justice – 
respect for property.  
Looking around we see other public goods in Smith. The emergence of currency is an 
emergent property of markets as they evolve, although, as in the case of public mores, 
the state may lend its authority to reinforce community norms. And the thing which 
most fundamentally distinguishes us from the animals is an emergent public good. 
Adam Smith wrote a treatise on the emergence of language in which he spelled out 
precisely this quality of language as an emergent product of individuals seeking only 
their own private ends. A rule of grammar would “establish itself insensibly, and by 
slow degrees” as a consequence of the human “love of analogy and similarity of sound” 
as people “would endeavour to make their mutual wants intelligible to each other”.6  
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Thus, as Otteson has spelled out, Smith’s “market model” in which public goods are 
the emergent and unintended product of private endeavours to meet private needs, 
applies not just to the way markets serve the common good and produce public goods, 
but also to the way language, currency and social mores emerge – all of which are 
foundations of a market order. We might summarise by saying that the public goods 
of language and widely shared social mores, and a currency, are the preconditions for 
the emergence of a sophisticated market order, which itself is the precondition for the 
emergence of the public good of market prices and liquidity.  
V 
And here’s the thing. Since Smith, economics has always taken the central problem of 
public goods to be the difficulty of funding them, given the presence of free-riders. But 
by virtue of their very nature as emergent properties of self-seeking humans, within 
society no-one has had to pass round the hat to bring emergent public goods into 
existence. They’re no more or less than the accretions of life itself! 
Smith’s Newtonian schema allows Smith to explain how social mores which underpin 
the ascent to increasing opulence in the economy and virtue amongst the people all 
emerge from a single source – human sympathy between free people. Neither the 
crown nor its government intrudes in any way although at some stage in the tradition 
of British Common Law (Smith also lectured in Jurisprudence) the state may publicly 
legitimate and re-enforce what are already private conceptions of justice.  
And now Web 2.0 brings us a panoply of new emergent public goods: the 
epiphenomena of those seeking private benefits for themselves. Though it predates the 
coining of the expression Web 2.0, open source software is paradigmatic. Although 
sometimes driven by loftier motives, the motive for a great deal of open source 
software coding is the private interest of a user in solving their own problems by fixing 
bugs or adding features. Once coded the producer has an interest in having their code 
incorporated into the project and so donates it. One can tell similar stories about the 
other ‘Public Goods 2.0’ like blogging, Flickr and Wikipedia – though of course there 
are richer motives in play as well. It is to those we now turn. 
VI 
Smith’s intensely, inextricably social, picture of the way we are constituted finds its 
way into his economics. Despite his desire to construct his economics around the 
single principle of our innate tendency to “truck barter and exchange”, in lectures 
delivered before The Wealth of Nations, Smith permitted himself the thought that 
there was something even more fundamental, human sociality and (note Smith the 
rhetorician!) the desire to persuade. Here is Smith’s ‘oratorical’ theory of a bargain.  
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If we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which this 
disposition of trucking is founded, it is clearly the naturall inclination every 
one has to persuade. The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have 
so plain and simple a meaning, is in reality offering an argument to 
persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest.  
Of all economists, Smith would have understood the foundational proposition of what 
might be taken as an early Web 2.0 credo, “the cluetrain manifesto” – “Markets are 
conversations”. And, although no doubt Smith would have been amazed at some of 
the more amazing things about Web 2.0 – like Wikipedia for instance – he might have 
been one of the least amazed. For so much of the engine behind Web 2.0 is the same as 
the engine Smith saw behind society – the dialectic of human sociality.  
In this regard note Odlyzko’s (2001) documentation of the how much larger a share of 
the economy is driven by our desire for interaction between two specific parties, 
compared with broadcasting or publishing from one source to many. Speaking of the 
US economy Odlyzko observes:  
What is striking is how highly valued [two way] communications is. . . . Our 
postal system alone collects almost as much money as our entire movie 
industry, even though the latter benefits from large foreign sales. For all the 
publicity it attracts, entertainment is simply not all that large, because 
people are not willing to pay very much for it. . . . [C]ommunications is 
huge, and represents the collective decisions of millions of people about 
what they want. It is also growing relative to the rest of the economy in a 
process that goes back centuries. As a fraction of the US economy, it has 
grown more than 15-fold over the last 150 years. The key point . . . is that 
most of this spending is on connectivity, the standard point-to-point 
communications, and not for broadcast media that distribute “content.” 
Odlyzko documents how pundits and market players have repeatedly overestimated 
our preparedness to pay for content, while underestimating our desire for inter-
connectedness, from the underestimation of the value of Bell’s telephone for social 
communication, to the ARPANET’s engineers’ surprise at the popularity of e-mail to 
the under-appreciation of the value of mobile phones, and scepticism that SMSs were 
anything more than a toy gimmick. 
Smith doesn’t write about the power of propaganda or anything much emitted from a 
single source, however powerful. He writes about human beings creating their own 
world through their communication, their interest in what each other are thinking – in 
his terminology their sympathy – and their interaction. And he writes about the 
strength of their social desires, from the desire to communicate to their desire to fit in 
and be well regarded by each other. Those forces are now the dominant force behind 
the burgeoning of social networks, and many other phenomena of Web 2.0, right now. 
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VII 
Smith also gives us a more compelling portrait of the psychology of motivation and 
achievement. For homo economicus the attraction of power, fame or wealth is simple 
greed for more. Smith is a better psychologist. “[T]o what purpose is all the toil and 
bustle of this world?” Smith asks about the human drive towards avarice and 
ambition? Smith concludes “It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which 
interests us.” 
Is it to supply the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer 
can supply them. . . . To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of 
with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which 
we can propose to derive from it.  
This rings true for me, and perhaps more importantly for Warren Buffett recently 
quoted in uncannily Smithian terms (Lewis, 2009):  
Basically, when you get to my age you’ll really measure your success in life 
by how many of the people you want to have love you actually do love you. I 
know people who have a lot of money, and they get testimonial dinners and 
they get hospital wings named after them. But the truth is that nobody in 
the world loves them. 
This striving for fame, glory, the respect of peers is an important, though not 
necessarily primary motive behind much coding of open source software and it surely 
lies behind a great deal of the voluntary work that is done on blogs, and any number of 
other Web 2.0 phenomena. Smith comments at some length on the intensity of our 
desire to discover something of ourselves in others, and our desire to reciprocate both 
the favours we are done, and the slights.7 
What most of all charms us in our benefactor, is the concord between his 
sentiments and our own, with regard to what interests us so nearly as the 
worth of our own character, and the esteem that is due to us. We are 
delighted to find a person who values us as we value ourselves, and 
distinguishes us from the rest of mankind, with an attention not unlike that 
with which we distinguish ourselves. To maintain in him these agreeable 
and flattering sentiments, is one of the chief ends proposed by the returns 
we are disposed to make to him.8 
And Smith understood that there are all sorts of quirky, all-too-human motivations 
arising from our social instincts. They’re powering Web 2.0 also. As Nicholson Baker 
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wrote recently (2008), the initial sources, such as the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
and other public domain publications, which provided a “seed” for many entries, and 
altruism, don’t fully explain Wikipedia‘s success.  
The real reason it grew so fast was noticed by co-founder Jimmy “Jimbo” 
Wales in its first year of life. “The main thing about Wikipedia is that it is 
fun and addictive,” Wales wrote. Addictive, yes. All big Internet successes – 
e-mail, chat, Facebook, Gawker, Second Life, YouTube, Daily Kos, World of 
Warcraft –have a more or less addictive component – they hook you 
because they are solitary ways to be social: you keep checking in, peeking in, 
as you would to some noisy party going on downstairs in a house while 
you’re trying to sleep. 
In a treatise on the history of astronomy remarkably prescient of Thomas Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Smith explained the motivation behind scientific 
progress as driven by the mental discomfort of things not quite “adding up”. The mind 
seeks to relieve the “chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this tumult 
of the imagination, and to restore it, when it surveys the great revolutions of the 
universe, to that tone of tranquillity and composure, which is both most agreeable in 
itself, and most suitable to its nature.” And indeed it’s the stub, the niggling error, 
outrageous claim, the irritating infelicity that keeps some up at night 
VIII 
So where does this leave us in considering copyright in the world of Web 2.0 and 
remix. In fact Smith accepted copyright, at least for the fourteen years protection it 
spanned in his day, “as an encouragement to the labours of learned men”. 
And this is perhaps as well adapted to the real value of the work as any 
other, for if the book be a valuable one the demand for it in that time will 
probably be a considerable addition to his fortune. But if it is of no value the 
advantage he can reap from it will be very small. These two privileges 
therefore, as they can do no harm and may do some good, are not to be 
altogether condemned. But there are few so harmless”.9  
Given Smith‘s scepticism about publicly sanctioned monopolies, one can’t imagine 
him looking on the IP expansionism of our own time with either pleasure or surprise. 
My guess is that Smith would have continued to approve of copyright where it 
underpins production that would not otherwise take place, but not beyond that point.  
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My one practical suggestion combines my admiration for Smith and one of my own 
country’s policy successes. We reined in the monster of protectionism that Smith 
warned against by insisting that any change to protection be preceded by an 
independent study analysing its net economic effects. Given the way in which IP 
protection has been ramped up in circumstances that make it highly dubious that it 
will lead to more production 10 I have for some time argued that we should agitate to 
enshrine the principle in international negotiations that no increase in IP be 
negotiated ahead of an independent study demonstrating its net global economic 
benefits.  
Further the more I see of the politics of IP, the more I see international agreements 
operating simply as constraints on what national governments can do. They can 
indeed be constraints, and to some extent that is their point. But it’s remarkable how 
often it seems to be forgotten that we negotiate international agreements. Given this, 
every time I hear someone tell me that sensible reform isn’t possible under this or that 
international agreement, whether it be multilateral like TRIPS, or bilateral like the 
Australia US Free Trade Agreement, I’d like to hear them add words to the effect that 
we should bring up the problem at the very next international meeting where these 
agreements are discussed.  
But I began this paper suggesting that Smith might help us meet James Boyle’s 
challenge of going beyond contemporary economic concerns in conceptualising the 
issues at stake in intellectual property. To recap, Boyle wants something broader, more 
“human” than the simple totting up of costs and benefits typical of contemporary 
economics. Remarkably enough, Smith offers several promising leads.  
 He shows us something that is usually impossible to find in most economics 
textbooks. There is a substantial class of pure public goods which are 
‘emergent’. Thrown off spontaneously by social and intellectual interaction 
they require no funding or outside intervention.  
 Web 2.0 is now scaling up this miracle, generating a kaleidoscopic array of 
new global public goods funded from nothing more than the restless sociality 
of our species not least our desire for the esteem of our fellows. As Smith put 
it, our striving for wealth, or fame or glory isn’t for the thing itself but for 
what it brought – an “easy empire over the affections of mankind”. For the 
most part, a collaborative web can be funded without any monopoly in the 
content produced. 
If this underscores the economic reason for avoiding excessive IP protection, it also 
hints at that “human” aspect that James Boyle is after. For as we extend IP we are 
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discovering areas in which our human instincts recoil. It may or may not entail more 
economic benefits than costs to allow the patenting of human genes – though 
somehow I doubt it. But it had better be economically worthwhile, because economic 
considerations aside, it seems kind of creepy. If I ask whether should I be free to use 
Tim O’Reilly’s term “Web 2.0” as I like – and as I have, without payment and indeed, 
until now even without acknowledgement – economics says “yes”. That’s because the 
only case for providing monopolistic protection is to bring forth IP. And yet we have 
the expression delivered to the world, safe and sound without it. 
 But there’s another, more “human” answer. Commonsense – if I might be permitted 
to invoke such an abused term – says “yes” too. We humans like communicating and 
interacting amongst each other. Our communication today is built on our own, and 
others’, past communications. And it’s easy to see harm coming from outside 
interference in that process and from commercialising it. At least as applied to the 
intimacies of daily life, it’s kind of creepy. Smith surely reinforces that commonsense. 
Certainly for his time, but even today, a remarkable characteristic of Smith is his faith 
in human culture’s capacity to build itself in a healthy way from the ground up, from 
the smallest interactions between the most ordinary people and his concomitant 
scepticism of what could be gained from any heavy handed interventions in that 
process. 
In this regard, we should heed the lesson from the last thing Smith ever wrote for 
publication. The revolutionaries of France and America had warmed to Smith’s 
confidence that people could be the authors of their own culture, and his faith in the 
way the small details of human life and human culture, when left to their own devices, 
within the rule of law ultimately build better lives. But like his friend Edmund Burke, 
Smith looked on the events of 1789 in France with great anxiety. As a result, the next 
year, the year of his death, he added a section to the final edition of his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, which thus became both the first and last book he published.  
Anxious like Burke about the way in which those in power could overreach themselves 
he penned a section against “the man of system”.  
The man of system. . . is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of 
his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest 
deviation from any part of it. . . . He seems to imagine that he can arrange 
the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand 
arranges the different pieces upon a chess–board. He does not consider that 
the pieces upon the chess–board have no other principle of motion besides 
that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess–
board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its 
own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to 
impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same 
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direction, the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, 
and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or 
different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times 
in the highest degree of disorder.11 
Finally, I can’t finish without observing that Smith might have wanted to add one 
more thing. Amid the unruly mix of motives that have always powered the emergent 
phenomena of social life, and now power the emergent public goods of Web 2.0, we 
catch glimpses of our better selves. And we come to see ourselves as others see us – 
and encounter others doing the same. Something tells the blogger, the Wikipedian, the 
coder of the next distribution of Wordpress or Linux, that their quest for that “easy 
empire over the affections of mankind”, is just a foretaste of our destiny, which can 
only be found on our halting journey towards that more distant and difficult ultimate 
destination – virtue itself. 
 
Editorial note: quotations from Adam Smith and Edmund Burke are unexpurgated 
and contain anomalous 18th century spellings.  
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